Title
Pilat v. Cahoon, initial
Date
July 10, 2018
State or Country
Virginia
County/City:
Alexandria City
The Court the Case was filed in
Circuit Court
Type of Case
Divorce
Case Number
17003536
Judges
Lisa B Kemler
Plaintiff
Jennifer Elizabeth Pilat
Defendant
Teri Lucille Cahoon
Plaintiff Attorney
Katherine Carlos
Defendant Attorney
Lisa Brown, obsolete
Comments
1. The parties were "married" in CT before it was legal, and it was not recognized by the state of residence wherein the parties lived for 6+ years before a move to VA was forced on the defendant and children.
2. 2 children were adopted without a marriage recognized. The third child is my biological daughter who's original birth certificate had only my name as parent.
3. no comment on declaration that neither were active military at that time. No recognition by court that I am an honorably discharged veteran.
4. No recognition that I was in a different county nor the reasons why. No recognition that defendant's name was on lease of "plaintiff's bona fide" residence when both parties arrived in VA in August 2016, that defendant's name was maliciously removed without her knowledge after she was ordered out of housing.
5. "Separated" is a lie. I was thrown out of my home. No recognition of the legal definition of abandonment: the act of intentionally and permanently giving up, surrendering, deserting or relinquishing … a spouse and/or children. Abandonment of a spouse means intent at permanent separation...
6. 1.-17. No comment. Little understanding. Assumed to be biased and discriminatory.
2. No recognition as to the aggressive threats made to defendant by plaintiff in front of children regarding motorcyle, that defendant had been ordered to surrender to plaintiff, that plaintiff had ruined the motorcycle by willful neglect.
3. no recognition that plaintiff's retirement was built for 6 years at expense to the defendant who was a fulltime parent and therefore contributor to plaintiff's retirement by default.
1. Spousal support was denied, because abandonment by plaintiff was permitted.
2. Defendant's income is misrepresented; IRS records show the income at less than $20,000 in 2017 and less than $10,000 in 2016 (year of abandonment)
A. The plaintiff and defendant terms were wrongly entered, accurate elsewhere.
B. This order was not followed by the plaintiff.
C. I did not agree.
3. This is important. I and all 3 children were on medicaid until children were sold to plaintiff in 2019 when I had to pay nearly 50% of the plaintiff's affluent choice for insurance.
4. The children had full coverage medicaid. See above statement.
5. It is important to note that when children were further abused by judge, defendant had care of 2 younger children for 3/4 of year 2019, but plaintiff claimed on taxes in violation of this clause as well as logic set forth by IRS regarding dependants.
C. no recognition of income disparity nor reason for court, further effect of refusing to charge plaintiff with abandonment.
D. beginning of bias to choose Plaintiff to have "final decision making authority" of children living in abandoned party's house.
2. No acknowledgement of later evidence that oldest child knew court details never disclosed in defendant's home.
3. There is no record as to why the custody was divided as such, no record of concerns for oldest child's past trauma and current acting out.
4. notice "four-hour period" clause. I worked nights, and judge was constantly derogatory toward my job and my income. By the time this order was made available to defendant (3 months after court), no attorney was present to explain this document.
5. more bias: only defendant has restrictions on overnight guests. no acknowledgement that defendant's survival job for the first 10 months had been hosting AirBnB. only defendant is restricted to children sleeping without another adult. only defendant has limitations to rent a room out.
6. more bias: plaintiff holds passports because of preposterous exaggerations that plaintiff's income and habits of travel might be executed by defendant.
6 (again). no recognition that defendant had to go through extreme means to access oldest child's academics while voluntarily including plaintiff in all forms/records submitted to schools of younger children.
F. Again judge represents separation as voluntary and refuses to acknowledge crime of abandonment by plaintiff. Constant lies. Constant slander. Constant bias. all built on allowance of criminal activity.
For more details as to background on children and family formation, including verbal agreements between plaintiff and defendant that were ignored by judge, please purchase book "Yaki Plus 3: An American Account of a Birthing Lesbian" as found on Amazon and Goodreads.
Contact Info
Teri "Yaki" Cahoon
@teriyakicahoon
yakiplus3@gmail.com
803-873-1031
Judges Comments
THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the 10 th day of July, 2018 for a final hearing,
and upon consideration of the testimony and evidence presented and the argument of
counsel, the Court having announced its findings and rulings from the bench on July 10,
2018, the transcript of which is filed herewith and made a part of this Final Decree of
Divorce;
UPON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it appearing to the Court, independently
of the admissions of either party in the pleadings or otherwise, that this court has
jurisdiction to determine the dissolution of the marriage and that the following was
proved by the evidence presented:
1. The parties hereto were lawfully married to each other on the 6 th day of
April, 2010 in Stamford, Connecticut;
2. There were three (3) children born or adopted of the marriage: MMP, DOB ..., TLCP, DOB ..., and
TLCP, DOB ...
3. The parties hereto are over the age of eighteen (18) years. Neither party is an active duty member of the United States Armed Forces.
4. The Plaintiff is a bona fide resident and domiciliary of the Commonwealth
of Virginia and has been such for more than six (6) months immediately preceding the
institution of this suit.
5. The parties separated on September 1, 2016 and have lived separate and
apart without any cohabitation and without interruption from the time of separation to the
present time and that at the time of separation it was the intention of the Plaintiff that this
separation be permanent.
6. There is no probability of reconciliation between the parties.
NOTICES and INFORMATION:
Pursuant to Virginia Code § 20-60.3, the following information is provided:
1. Notice is hereby given that support payment may be withheld as they
become due pursuant to §20-79.1 or §20-79.2, from income as defined in §63.2-1900,
without further amendments of this order or having to file an application for services with
the Department of Social Services.
2. Notice is hereby given that support payments may be withheld pursuant to
Chapter 19 (§63.2-1900 et seq) of Title 63.2 without further amendments to the order
upon application for services with the Department of Social Services.
3. The name, date of birth and the last four (4) digits of the social security
number of each child to whom a duty of support is then owed by the parent as follows:
Name Date of Birth Resides With Last 4 SSN
...
4. The name, date of birth, the last four (4) digits of the social security
number of each parent of the children and, unless otherwise ordered, each parent’s
residential, and if different, mailing address, residential and employer telephone number,
driver’s license number, and the name and address of his or her employer as follows:
Person responsible for paying child support is ...
5. Notice that, pursuant to §20-124.2, support will continue to be paid for
any child over the age of 18 who is (i) a full-time high school student, (ii) not self-
supporting, and (iii) living in the home of the party seeking or receiving child support
until such child reaches the age of nineteen (19) or graduates from high school,
whichever occurs first, and that the court may also order that support be paid or continue
to be paid for any child over the age of eighteen (18) who is (a) severely and permanently
mentally or physically disabled and such disability existed prior to the child reaching the
age of 18 or 19 if the child met the requirements of clauses (i) (ii) and (iii), (b) unable to
live independently and support himself, and (c) residing in the home of the parent seeking
or receiving child support.
6. Notice is hereby given that a petition may be filed for suspension of any
license, certificate, registration or other authorization to engage in a profession, trade,
business, occupation or recreational activity issued to the obligor by the Commonwealth
of Virginia to a parent as provided in §63.2-1937 upon the occurrence of a delinquency
for a period of (90) days or more or in an amount of $5,000.00 or more. Neither party
holds such a license.
7. The Order of this Court as to the amount of the child support, and ruling as
to spousal support, expressed in fixed sums per monthly period, together with the
payment intervals, the dates payments are due, the date the first payment is due, and the
amount of each payment are set forth in the support provisions of this Order.
8. a. This Order contains a provision for health care coverage, including the
health insurance policy information, for dependent children pursuant to §§20-108.1 and
108.2, if available at reasonable cost. This Order contains a statement as to whether
health care coverage is provided for a spouse or former spouse.
b. This Order contains a statement whether any unreimbursed medical
expenses are to be paid by or reimbursed to a party pursuant to Subsections D and G of
§20-108.2, and if such expenses are ordered, then the provisions governing how such
payment is to be made.
9. The Order of this Court as to the amount and terms of any arrearages in
support are set forth in the arrearage provision of this Order. Notice is hereby given that
at any time support arrearages should exist, all payments made are to be credited to
current support obligations first, with any payment in excess of the current obligation
applied to the arrearage.
10. If at any time child support payments are ordered to be paid through the
Department of Social Services or directly to a party, and unless the Court for good cause
shown orders otherwise, the parties shall give each other and the Court, and, when
payments are to be made through the Department, the Department of Social Services at
least thirty (30) days= written notice, in advance, of any change of address and any
change of telephone number within thirty (30) days after the change
11. In the event that child support payments are ordered to be paid to the
Department of Social Services, the obligor must keep the court and the Department of
Social Services informed of the name, address and telephone number of her current
employer, or if the payments are ordered to be paid directly to the obligee, the obligor
must keep the court informed of the name, address and telephone number of her current
employer.
12. In the event that child support payments are ordered to be paid to the
Department of Social Services, the party obligated to provide health care coverage shall
keep the Department of Social Services informed of any changes in the availability of
health care coverage for the minor child or children, or if payments are ordered to be paid
directly to the obligee, the party obligated to provide health care coverage shall keep the
other party informed of any changes in the availability of the health care coverage for the
minor child or minor children.
13. The separate amounts due to each person under this Order for child
support, for spousal support or for a unitary award, or the affirmation of a separation
agreement, are set forth in the support provision of this Order.
14. Notice is hereby provided that in determination of a support obligation, the
support obligation as it becomes due and unpaid creates a judgment, by operation of law.
Notice is further provided pursuant to §20-78.2, that any judgment shall accrue interest
on the arrearage at the judgment rate of interest established by §6.1-330.54 unless the
obligee, in a writing submitted to the court, waives the collection of interest.
15. Notice is hereby given that the Department of Social Services may,
pursuant to Chapter 19 (§63.2-1900) of Title 63.2 and in accordance with §20-108.2 and
§63 .2-1921, initiate a review of the amount of support ordered by any court.
16. If any arrearages for child support, including interest or fees, exist at the,
time the youngest child included in the order emancipates, payments shall continue in the
total amount due (current support plus amount applied toward arrearages) at the time of
emancipation until all arrearages are paid.
17. Notice is hereby given that in cases enforced by the Department of Social
Services, the Department of Motor Vehicles may suspend or refuse to renew the driver's
license of any person upon receipt of notice from the Department of Social Services that
the person (i) is delinquent in the payment of child support by ninety (90) days or in an
amount of $5,000 or more or (ii) has failed to comply with a subpoena, summons, or
warrant relating to paternity or child support proceedings.
WHEREUPON, the Court having considered the statutory factors set forth in the
Code of Virginia, including Virginia Code §§ 20-107.3, 20-107.1, 20-108.1, 20-108.2,
20-124.3 and all testimony and evidence submitted and the argument of counsel, and
having stated the basis for its ruling that has been reduced to a writing, attached hereto,
and made a part of this Order; it is hereby
ADJUDGED, ORDERED, and DECREED as follows:
A. DIVISION OF PROPERTY
1. VEHICLES. Each party shall be the sole owner of her respective vehicle.
2. MOTORCYCLE. The motorcycle is awarded the Defendant, Ms.
Cahoon, if she wishes to retain it, and she shall ensure that it is titled and registered in her
name, and she shall be solely responsible for it. In the event Defendant does not wish to
keep the motorcycle, it shall be sold and the proceeds divided equally.
3. RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS. Each party shall be the sole owner of her
own respective retirement account(s).
B. SUPPORT
1. SPOUSAL SUPPORT. Defendant’s request for spousal support is
denied, and neither party shall owe the other party spousal support.
2. CHILD SUPPORT. The court finds that the Plaintiff’s income for child
support purposes is $45,000 per year, and the Defendant’s income for child support
purposes is $40,000 per year.
A. Monthly Support Obligation. Pursuant to the attached Split Custody Support
Guideline Worksheet, the Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $284.00 each
month beginning on October 1, 2018.
B. Work Related Child Care. The amount of work related child care costs was
not determined by this court. Therefore, the parties shall share the costs of reasonable and
necessary work related child care in proportion to their gross incomes used for
determination of the monthly child support (Plaintiff 53%, Defendant 47%).
C. Adoption Subsidy. The parties receive an adoption subsidy, which is currently
in the amount of $691.00 per month for their adopted children, M and T. The
parties agree that they will split the adoption subsidy equally, for so long as Plaintiff has
primary custody of M and Defendant has primary custody of T. If possible,
the parties will direct the issuing entity to send one half of the payment directly to each of
them; however, effective October 1, 2018 and for so long as the payment is made in a
unitary amount, the party receiving the subsidy shall pay the other party one-half of the
total amount no later than five days after receipt of same.
D. Arrearages. There are no arrearages in child support at this time.
3. HEALTH INSURANCE. The minor children are presently insured under
Medicaid. For good cause shown, neither party is presently obligated to provide medical
insurance for the children. In the event either party provides medical insurance for the
children in the future, the cost of the premium allocated to the children (self + children
less self only) shall be shared with Plaintiff paying 53% and Defendant paying 47%.
There is no order for health care coverage of the spouse or former spouse.
4. The parties shall pay all reasonable and necessary unreimbursed medical
or dental expenses for each child subject of this Order with the Plaintiff paying 53% and
the Defendant paying 47%. Each party shall pay his respective share of expenses as they
are incurred. Any amount paid under this subsection shall not be adjusted by, nor added
to, the child support calculation above. For the purposes of this section, medical or dental
expenses shall include but not be limited to eyeglasses, prescription medication,
prosthetics, orthodontics, and mental health or developments disability services,
including but not limited to services provided by a social worker, psychologist,
psychiatrist, counselor or therapist.
5. TAX DEDUCTIONS. Each party shall be entitled to claim the child[ren]
in their primary physical custody each year for tax purposes.
C. ATTORNEY’S FEES. Each party shall be responsible for her own attorney’s
fees. However, the parties shall share equally the cost of the court reporter for this trial
and (per agreement of counsel) the cost of the transcription of this court’s ruling.
D. CUSTODY/VISITATION.
1. LEGAL CUSTODY/SCHOOL DISTRICT. The parties shall have joint
legal custody of the children, and shall confer and endeavor to reach an agreement as to
the children’s education, health and well-being. If the parties are unable to agree, the
Plaintiff, Jennifer E. Pilat, shall have final decision making authority. However. to the
extent that the parties are not living in the same school district, T an T may
attend a public school within Ms. Cahoon’s district or another school that the parties
agree is in the best interest of T and T.
The parties shall keep each other apprised of doctors appointments, activities and
events of the children sufficiently in advance so that the other parent can attend if desired.
2. NON-DISPARAGEMENT. Neither parent shall engage in any conduct
that disparages the other parent in front of the children or could cause the children to
blame or fault the other parent for the divorce.
3. PHYSICAL CUSTODY. M shall reside primarily with the Plaintiff, Ms. Pilat, and T and T shall reside primarily with the Defendant, Ms.Cahoon.
4. VISITATION.
a. Weekly. Each parent shall have reasonable visitation with the
children not less than every other weekend from Friday at 6 pm until Sunday at 6 pm,
except that if Monday is a holiday, visitation shall be extended until 6 p.m. Monday.
b. Holidays. The parties shall alternate major holidays as follows:
i. Christmas. Winter/Christmas break shall be divided equally.
The portion containing Christmas day shall be rotated such each party receives Christmas
on alternate years.
ii. Thanksgiving. Thanksgiving break shall be defined as
beginning with the conclusion of school prior to Thanksgiving, and concluding the
Sunday after Thanksgiving. The parties shall alternate Thanksgiving break each year.
iii. Spring Break. Spring Break shall be defined as beginning with
the conclusion of school and continuing through 6 pm day before school resumes. The
parties shall split Spring Break each year.
iv. Easter. The parties shall alternate Easter Sunday each year.
v. Mother’s Day/Father’s Day/Parties’ Birthdays. Plaintiff shall
have the children on Father’s Day and her birthday, and Defendant shall have the
children on Mother’s Day and her Birthday.
vi. Summer Break. Each party shall have the children for three
weeks each summer, two of which may be consecutive. The parties will notify each
other of their desired weeks by April 1 of each year. In the event of a conflict requested
weeks, Plaintiff’s request shall take precedence in even years and Defendant in odd years.
4. RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL. To the extent a party is unable to care for
the children for more than a four-hour period when the child[ren] is with that parent, the
parent shall give the other parent the right of first refusal to care for the child[ren] prior to
arranging for third party care.
5. UNRELATED THIRD PARTIES IN THE HOME/SLEEPING
ACCOMMODATIONS. Ms. Cahoon shall not have unknown or unrelated third parties
staying overnight or renting a room or space in her home while the children are present.
The children must have a separate bedroom available which is not shared with any other
adult. Ms. Cahoon may have a long -term renter provided she provides information to
Ms. Pilat as to that person’s identity and background so that Ms. Pilat may interview the
individual. In the event Ms. Pilat agrees to that individual and has no good cause to
object, said individual/renter may reside in the home with the children, provided the
separate bedroom requirement above is met. This will necessitate Ms. Cahoon residing
in a home with at least three bedrooms.
This provision is not intended to prohibit the presence of a third party with whom
either party has a serious romantic relationship.
6. PASSPORTS. Plaintiff shall maintain custody of the passports for all of
the children of the parties. Both parties shall have the right to reasonable and appropriate
travel with the children outside of the country. In the event that either party wishes to
take the children out of the country for travel, the other party shall be notified within 30
days of the anticipated travel, and shall provide the other party with a full itinerary
including location of stay, flight numbers, and contact information. Ms. Cahoon shall
return the children’s passports after any such travel outside of the U.S. within five days of
her return.
6. RECORDS OF CHILDREN. Pursuant to §20-124.6 neither party shall be
denied access to the academic, medical, hospital or other health records of the minor
children.
E. RELOCATION. Pursuant to §20-124.5 of the 1950 Code of Virginia, as
amended, either party who relocates his or her residence must give thirty (30) days
advance written notice of any such intended relocation and of any intended change of
address, said notice being given to both the other party and to this Court.
F. FINAL DECREE OF DIVORCE. The Plaintiff, Jennifer E. Pilat, is hereby
granted a Final Decree of Divorce, a vincula matrimonii, from the Defendant, Teri
Lucille Cahoon Pilat, on the grounds of having lived separate and apart, without
cohabitation and without interruption, with the purposes and intent of ending the
marriage for a period exceeding twelve months, and the bonds of matrimony heretofore
existing between them are forever dissolved.
H. NOTICE OF DEATH BENEFIT REVOCATION REQUIREMENTS.
Pursuant to Virginia Code 20-111.1(E), notice is hereby given that
beneficiary designations for any death benefit, as defined in subsection B of 20-111.1
of the Code of Virginia, made payable to a former spouse may or may not be
automatically revoked by operation of law upon the entry of a final decree of
annulment or divorce. If a party intends to revoke any beneficiary designation
made payable to a former spouse following the annulment or divorce, the party is
responsible for following any and all instructions to change such beneficiary
designation given by the provider of the death benefit. Otherwise, existing
beneficiary designations may remain in full force and effect after the entry of a final
decree of annulment or divorce.