JudicialPedia Logo
    • What’s In Your Toolbox?
      • ADA Advocate
      • Cash Courts vs. Constitutional Courts
      • Judicial Complaint against a Judge
      • Professional Code of Ethics
      • Resources
      • The Constitution
      • The Grand Jury
    • Browse Cases
    • Support
      • Contact Us
      • Donate
      • Partner
      • Thank You
    Add Case / Complaint
    Sign in or Register
    Add Case / Complaint

    Matthew Castillo,etc all v Glenn Youngkin, The Chesapeake School Board et al Verified listing

    • Date
      January 18, 2022
    • City/County
      Chesapeake, Virginia
    • Type of Case
      School Board DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF School Board Violations of Executive Order 2 (“EO 2”). f Parents allege that the School Board’s interference with their rights to direct their children’s care and education violates EO 2, S.B. 1303, and the Virginia Code, including Section 22.1-87, which prohibits the School Board from taking arbitrary and capricious action.
    • Case Details
    • prev
    • next
    • Bookmark
    • Copy link
    • Share
    • Report
    • prev
    • next
    Title

    Matthew Castillo,etc all v Glenn Youngkin, The Chesapeake School Board et al

    Case Number

    Record No. 220033

    State or Country
    Virginia
    Judges

    Chief Justice
    The Honorable S. Bernard Goodwyn
    Expiration of term: January 31, 2032
    Justices
    Hon. Donald W. Lemons
    Expiration of term: March 16, 2024
    The Honorable William C. Mims
    Expiration of term: March 31, 2022
    The Honorable Cleo E. Powell
    Expiration of term: July 31, 2023
    The Honorable D. Arthur Kelsey
    Expiration of term: January 31, 2027
    The Honorable Stephen R. McCullough
    Expiration of term: March 2, 2028
    The Honorable Teresa M. Chafin
    Expiration of term: August 31, 2031
    Senior Justices
    The Honorable Charles S. Russell
    The Honorable Lawrence L. Koontz, Jr.
    The Honorable LeRoy F. Millette, Jr.

    Defendant

    Respondents.

    GLENN A. YOUNGKIN, in his official
    capacity as Governor of Virginia,
    COLIN GREENE, in his official capacity
    as Acting State Health Commissioner for
    the Commonwealth of Virginia,
    JILLIAN BALOW, in her official capacity
    as Acting Superintendent of Public Instruction
    for the Commonwealth of Virginia,
    SCHOOL BOARD OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE,
    and
    JARED COTTON, in his official capacity
    as Superintendent of Chesapeake City Public Schools,

    Plaintiff Attorney

    Kevin E. Martingayle, Esquire (VSB #33865)
    BISCHOFF MARTINGAYLE, P.C.
    3704 Pacific Avenue, Suite 300
    Virginia Beach, VA 23451
    (757) 233-9991
    (757) 416-6009 (direct dial)
    (757) 428-6982 (facsimile)
    Email: martingayIebischoffmartingayIe.com

    Social Networks
    • Other
    • Website
    • Other
    Document Links 1 (Scribd et. al)

    https://www.oag.state.va.us/files/2022/Castillo-v-Youngkin-Response.pdf

    Document Link 2

    https://drive.google.com/file/d/104luJVx9zvUXAi6U87guZOMc2tggS92R/view

    Date
    January 18, 2022
    Type of Case
    School Board DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF School Board Violations of Executive Order 2 (“EO 2”). f Parents allege that the School Board’s interference with their rights to direct their children’s care and education violates EO 2, S.B. 1303, and the Virginia Code, including Section 22.1-87, which prohibits the School Board from taking arbitrary and capricious action.
    The Court the Case was filed in

    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA

    County/City:
    Chesapeake, Virginia
    Plaintiff

    Petitioners,

    MATTHEW CASTILLO,
    CHRISTINE M. THOMPSON.
    JESSICA PETERSON,
    ANASTASIA GALINTO,
    DAVID MCFARLAND
    WERNER I. ROBLES GONZALEZ,
    VIRGINIA GNADT
    AMBER BOWMER,
    CATHLENE UHL,
    KATHRYN KAIN,
    JANET HOLSINGER,
    JEANNE HANEWICH
    and MELANIE CORNELISSE,

    Defendant Attorney

    JASON S. MIYARES
    Attorney General
    CHARLES H. SLEMP, III (#79742)
    Chief Deputy Attorney General
    Office of the Attorney General
    202 North Ninth Street
    Richmond, Virginia 23219
    (804) 786-5315 – Telephone
    (804) 371-0200 – Facsimile

    ANDREW N. FERGUSON (#86583)
    Solicitor General
    KEVIN M. GALLAGHER (#87548)
    Deputy Solicitor General
    GRAHAM K. BRYANT (#90592)
    ANNIE CHIANG (#94703)
    Assistant Solicitors General
    Counsel for Respondents Glenn A.
    Youngkin, Colin Greene, and
    Jillian Balow

    Comments

    MOTION TO DISMISS - For Defendants Gov. Glenn A. Youngkin, Colin Greene and Jillian Balow

    Pursuant to Rule 5:7(b)(6), respondents move to dismiss the Verified Petition for Writs of Mandamus and Prohibition because petitioners
    lack standing, mandamus and prohibition are improper remedies for
    the relief petitioners seek, and petitioners fail to state facts upon which
    relief should be granted.
    BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    The COVID-19 pandemic has posed a significant public health
    challenge in our public schools. State and local officials have struggled
    to balance the critical importance of in-person education and the fundamental right of all parents to direct the upbringing, care, and education
    of their children, see Code § 1-240.1, against mitigating the transmission of the virus. Nowhere have these interests been in greater conflict
    than with regard to the decision of some school boards to require children to wear masks in school irrespective of their parents’ wishes.
    The General Assembly conferred on the Governor broad authority
    to address these challenges. See Code § 44-146.17. On January 15, 2022,
    Governor Glenn Youngkin exercised that authority to issue Executive
    2
    Order 2 (EO 2), which allowed parents to “elect for their children not to
    be subject to any mask mandate in effect at the child’s school or educational program.” In so doing, EO 2 restores to parents the authority to
    assess the risks and benefits COVID-19 poses to their children’s specific
    circumstances and to make the best decision for their children based on
    current health information.
    Petitioners are parents of students enrolled in Chesapeake City
    Public Schools who prefer that school boards, rather than parents, decide whether children should wear masks in public schools. On January
    18, 2022, petitioners filed a petition for a writ of mandamus and prohibition contending that EO 2 violates Senate Bill 1303, 2021 Acts ch. 456
    (Spec. Sess. I), and exceeds the Governor’s executive authority. Pet. 6–7.
    Accordingly, petitioners ask this Court to declare EO 2 void and to
    “grant prohibition, mandamus and other appropriate relief.”
    LEGAL STANDARD
    Petitioners seek writs of mandamus and prohibition. These are
    both extraordinary remedies and, for that reason, this Court has “carefully scrutinized and imposed limitations upon” their use. Hertz v.
    Times-World Corp., 259 Va. 599, 607 (2000). They are not awarded as a
    3
    matter of right; instead, this Court issues them only “in the exercise of
    [its] sound judicial discretion.” Richmond-Greyhound Lines v. Davis,
    200 Va. 147, 151 (1958).
    A. Mandamus
    “Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy which may be used to
    compel a public official to perform a duty which is purely ministerial
    and which is imposed upon the official by law.” Gannon v. State Corp.
    Comm’n, 243 Va. 480, 481–82 (1992). This Court does not issue a writ of
    mandamus unless (1) the petitioner has a “clear right . . . to the relief
    sought,” (2) the respondent had a “legal duty . . . to perform the act
    which the petitioner seeks to compel,” and (3) the petitioner has available “no adequate remedy at law.” Bd. of Cnty. Supr’s v. Hylton Enters.,
    216 Va. 582, 584 (1976) (citing Richmond-Greyhound Lines, 200 Va. at
    152). If the petitioner fails to establish any of these elements, the Court
    will not issue the writ. Richmond-Greyhound Lines, 200 Va. at 152. And
    even if the petitioner satisfies them all, the Court does not issue the
    writ as a matter of right; issuance remains a matter of the Court’s discretion. Id. “In doubtful cases the writ will be denied.” Id. at 151.
    4
    B. Prohibition
    Similarly, “[a] writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy employed ‘to redress the grievance growing out of an encroachment of jurisdiction.’” In re Commonwealth’s Att’y for City of Roanoke, 265 Va.
    313, 316 (2003) (quoting Elliott v. Great Atl. Mgmt. Co., 236 Va. 334,
    338 (1988)). The purpose of the writ of prohibition is to supervise courts
    and judicial proceedings, not executive officers. See Howell v. McAuliffe,
    292 Va. 320, 353 n.19 (2016) (Writs of prohibition “are traditionally issued by ‘superior courts to the inferior courts, to restrain the latter from
    excess of jurisdiction.’” (original alterations omitted) (quoting Burch v.
    Hardwicke, 64 Va. 51, 58 (1873))); see also 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *111–12 (explaining that, at common law, the writ of prohibition was to restrain courts from asserting jurisdiction they did not
    have); James L. High, A Treatise on Extraordinary Legal Remedies
    § 762, at 705–06 (3d ed. 1896) (defining the writ of prohibition as “an
    extraordinary judicial writ” issued “for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally
    vested” (emphasis added)).
    5
    ARGUMENT
    The Court should dismiss the petition for three independent reasons. First, petitioners lack standing because they have failed to identify any cognizable injury of any kind, or to explain how any such injury
    is particularized to them. Second, the petition seeks relief that is unavailable in this Court’s original jurisdiction, as neither mandamus nor
    prohibition is a substitute for the injunctive relief petitioners seek from
    this Court. Finally, even if the petitioners had standing and their petition were procedurally proper, this Court should reject their claim on
    the merits because they have failed to identify a “clear right . . . to the
    relief sought.” Hylton Enters., 216 Va. at 584. Because petitioners’ right
    to relief is far from “clear and certain,” they are not entitled to the
    “drastic” and “extraordinary” remedy they seek and the petition for
    writs of mandamus and prohibition should be dismissed. Gannon, 243
    Va. at 482 (quoting Richmond-Greyhound Lines, 200 Va. at 151–52).
    I. Petitioners lack standing as they have neither alleged nor
    suffered any particularized injuries.
    No party may invoke the original jurisdiction of this Court unless
    they have standing to do so. Park v. Northam, Record No. 200767, slip
    6
    op. at 5 (Aug. 24, 2020) (unpublished).1 The petitioner “must allege facts
    indicating he or she has suffered a ‘particularized’ or ‘personalized’ injury due to [a governmental] action” to have standing to challenge that
    action via extraordinary writ. Park, slip op. at 5 (quoting Wilkins v.
    West, 264 Va. 447, 460 (2002)); see also Howell, 292 Va. at 330 (“It is incumbent on petitioners to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate standing.”). Simply “taking a position and then challenging the government
    to dispute it” is insufficient to establish standing. Lafferty v. Sch. Bd.,
    293 Va. 354, 365 (2017) (quoting City of Fairfax v. Shanklin, 205 Va.
    227, 231 (1964)). Instead, a petitioner “must demonstrate a ripe justiciable controversy by alleging an ‘actual or potential injury in fact based
    on present rather than future or speculative facts.’” Park, slip op. at 5
    (quoting Lafferty, 293 Va. at 361).
    This Court has recently addressed standing in petitions for extraordinary writs challenging executive actions responding to the
    COVID-19 pandemic. In Marrs v. Northam, this Court refused to issue
    a writ of mandamus to a voter who challenged the Governor’s executive
    1 Unpublished opinions and orders are cited herein as information
    pursuant to Rule 5:1(f).
    7
    order halting all in-person instruction in all Virginia public schools.
    Marrs v. Northam, Record No. 200573, slip op. at 2, 8 (June 17, 2020)
    (unpublished). This Court explained that standing is “a preliminary jurisdictional issue unrelated to the merits of [the] case.” Id. at 4. Where
    no evidence is taken, a party’s factual allegations—if any—are “presumed to be true when considering whether he or she has standing to
    request the relief sought.” Id. “‘The concept of standing concerns itself
    with the characteristics of the [individuals] who file[] suit’ and their interest in the outcome, and the requirements of standing apply to petitioners seeking writs of mandamus.” Park, slip op. at 5 (quoting
    Westlake Props., Inc. v. Westlake Pointe Prop. Owners Ass’n, 273 Va.
    107, 120 (2007)).2
    2 The importance of a case is irrelevant to the standing inquiry.
    Regardless of how “interesting and important to the public [a case] may
    be,” a court will not hear it unless petitioners show they are “aggrieved
    in some manner peculiar unto [themselves], aside and apart from that
    of other . . . residents.” Nicholas v. Lawrence, 161 Va. 589, 592–93
    (1933). This principle prevents courts from improvidently answering
    “abstract questions” that “lack any real ‘errors injuriously affecting’ the
    complaining litigants.” Howell, 292 Va. at 335 (quoting Nicholas, 161
    Va. at 593).
    8
    Petitioners claim to have standing to seek relief before this Court
    because they are parents and “have constitutionally recognized and protected rights and interests in caring for and protecting their children.”
    Pet. 2. That is the sum total of petitioners’ argument on standing. Although respondents agree that parents have a fundamental interest in
    the upbringing, education, and care of their children, see infra section
    III, this interest alone does not confer standing to sue for three reasons.
    First, petitioners have failed entirely to allege any injury at all.
    They claim they are “likely to suffer irreparable harm and damage if
    this Court declines to grant immediate relief.” Id. at 8. But that is a legal conclusion, not an allegation of fact. Petitioners must allege facts
    sufficient to demonstrate how the challenged conduct will invade their
    “immediate, pecuniary, and substantial interest,” Westlake Props., 273
    Va. at 120 (quoting Harbor Cruises, Inc. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 219 Va.
    675, 676 (1979)), which invasion could be redressed by their requested
    relief, see Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 371 (2001). But petitioners do not allege how they will be injured; the nature and scope of those
    injuries; or how the injuries would arise in the absence of the requested
    9
    relief. The absence of any factual allegations demonstrating their injuries is fatal to their petition.3
    Second, even assuming that the “harm and damage” claimed by
    petitioners is an increased risk of COVID-19 transmission caused by
    some parents choosing to have their children wear masks for less than
    the entire school day, petitioners have failed to allege how any of their
    putative injuries are particularized to them. They claim to suffer injury
    as “parents of children currently enrolled as students in Chesapeake
    City Public Schools.” Pet. 2. But any such injury is shared by every
    other parent of public-school students in Chesapeake—and, indeed in
    the entire Commonwealth. That is not a “unique injury or potential injury that would provide a basis for standing.” Lafferty, 293 Va. at 364;
    3 A petitioner may also establish standing by identifying a statute
    by which the General Assembly has created a “statutory right” to recovery. Goldman, 262 Va. at 373. Petitioners have identified no such statutory right in their petition. Although petitioners contend that EO 2 contravenes Senate Bill 1303, 2021 Acts ch. 456 (Spec. Sess. I), they do not
    assert that this enactment “gives them a legally enforceable right to
    have a court compel the [respondents] to perform [their] duties in the
    manner they request.” Goldman, 262 Va. at 374; see also Cherrie v. Va.
    Health Servs., Inc., 292 Va. 309, 315 (2016) (discussing the requirements of statutory standing).
    10
    see also Goldman, 262 Va. at 373 (petitioners must allege “a direct interest, pecuniary or otherwise, in the outcome of the controversy that is
    separate and distinct from the interest of the public at large”). Petitioners have “merely stated that they are parents of a child in the school
    district,” which is insufficient to establish standing. Lafferty, 293 Va. at
    364.
    Third, even if this Court were to conclude that petitioners have alleged sufficient facts to establish a cognizable injury particularized to
    them, that injury is incapable of redress by a judicial order. Hours before respondents filed this response, the Chesapeake School Board voted
    7-to-1 to make masking optional in Chesapeake City Public Schools beginning on January 24, 2022. Nathan Crawford, Chesapeake School
    Board Votes to Remove Mask in Alignment with Youngkin’s Executive
    Order, WAVY (Jan. 20, 2022, 6:35 p.m.), https://tinyurl.com/2p8h4dkz.
    The Chesapeake School Board’s independent decision to lift its mask
    mandate means that whatever injury petitioners believe they have suffered is not fairly traceable to EO2 and cannot be redressed by the relief
    they seek.
    11
    Petitioners’ failure to allege any facts supporting their claim to
    standing defeats their entitlement to mandamus. Accordingly, considering the “total absence of any allegation of a particularized injury,” this
    Court should hold that petitioners have “not established [their] standing to challenge any of the provisions [they] claim[] are unlawful” and
    dismiss the petition. Marrs, slip op. at 4.
    II. Petitioners inappropriately invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction to seek injunctive relief under the guise of mandamus and prohibition.
    Although presented as a petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition, petitioner in fact seeks traditional injunctive relief. “[M]andamus is always granted to compel the performance of some duty which
    has not been done” rather than as “a preventive remedy”; “its purpose
    and object is to command performance, not desistance.” Bd. of Supr’s v.
    Combs, 160 Va. 487, 498 (1933). The “function of an injunction is ‘to restrain motion and enforce inaction,’” whereas “the function of mandamus is ‘to set in motion and compel action.’” Adkins v. Va. Redistricting
    Comm’n, Record No. 210770, slip op. at 6 (Sept. 22, 2021) (unpublished)
    (quoting James L. High, A Treatise on Extraordinary Legal Remedies
    § 6, at 10 (1874)). “An injunction preserves the status quo, while ‘the
    12
    very object of [mandamus] is to change the status of affairs and to substitute action for inactivity.’” Id. (original alterations omitted) (quoting
    High, A Treatise on Extraordinary Legal Remedies § 6, at 10).
    Petitioners’ objective here is not to compel respondents to take any
    action. Petitioners readily acknowledge that they “are seeking to restrain, invalidate and prevent” respondents from “engag[ing] in certain
    actions that are opposed by petitioners.” Pet. 3. As this Court held in
    Adkins, “asking the Court to prevent the respondents from taking certain actions” is an improper “attempt to use mandamus as a substitute
    for injunction,” which this Court lacks original jurisdiction to issue. Adkins, slip op. at 6, 8. Accordingly, mandamus does not lie for the relief
    petitioners seek.
    Petitioners also improperly invoke the writ of prohibition as a substitute for injunctive relief. The petition asks this Court to award “writs
    of prohibition to prevent and restrain the respondents from taking action based on” the directive portion of EO 2 or in violation of Senate Bill
    1303, 2021 Acts ch. 456 (Spec. Sess. I). Pet. 9–10 (emphasis added). Prohibition, however, is not a synonym for injunction. It is instead a nar-
    13
    row extraordinary remedy available only to restrain a judicial act exceeding the tribunal’s authority. See In re Commonwealth’s Att’y, 265
    Va. at 316–17. A writ of prohibition may issue to restrain courts and
    quasi-judicial bodies attempting to exceed their judicial powers, but it is
    unavailable outside the judicial context. Bee Hive Mining Co. v. Indus.
    Comm’n of Va., 144 Va. 240, 242–43 (1926). Because “this matter does
    not involve the use of judicial powers . . . prohibition does not lie.” Adkins, slip op. at 7.
    III. Petitioners have not identified a clear right to relief.
    Even if petitioners could establish that they have standing and
    that they are seeking an appropriate remedy, this Court should decline
    to issue the relief requested for several reasons. First, EO 2 does not
    conflict with Senate Bill 1303, 2021 Acts ch. 456 (Spec. Sess. I), as petitioners claim. Pet. 6. Senate Bill 1303 directs schools to follow the
    guidelines recommended by the federal Centers for Disease Control and
    Prevention (CDC), see Senate Bill 1303, § 2 (Spec. Sess. I); neither it nor
    those guidelines impose a “mask mandate[],” Pet. 6.4
    4 E.g., CDC, Omicron Variant: What You Need to Know (Dec. 20,
    2021), https://tinyurl.com/2kyzk62e; CDC, Guidance for COVID-19 Prevention in K-12 Schools (Jan. 13, 2022), https://tinyurl.com/yutek7ne.
    14
    And even if the CDC issued something other than recommendations, Senate Bill 1303 would not require rigid adherence to every CDC
    promulgation; instead, the bill explicitly provides that in-person instruction should be provided in a manner which adheres “to the maximum extent practicable, to any currently applicable mitigation strategies” provided by the CDC for childcare and education programs. Senate
    Bill 1303, § 2 (Spec. Sess. I) (emphasis added). It does not (and could
    not) require schools unthinkingly to adopt every item on the vast menu
    of options that exist for warding off COVID-19 in schools, a list starting
    at social distancing and extending all the way to “replacement and upgrades of equipment to improve the indoor air quality in school facilities, including . . . ventilation, and air conditioning systems, filtering
    purification, fans, [and] control systems.”5 EO 2.
    5 Indeed, a wide range of studies demonstrate that the benefits of
    compelling children to wear masks in school remain unclear. At least
    one study concluded that compulsory mask mandates for students had
    no statistically significant effect on the transmission of the virus. Jenna
    Gettings, et al., Mask Use and Ventilation Improvements to Reduce
    COVID-19 Incidence in Elementary Schools — Georgia, November 16–
    December 11, 2020, CDC (May 28, 2021) https://tinyurl.com/nhbb8cud.
    On the other hand, the masks most commonly used by school children have been shown to pose serious health risks rather than protection. See ScienceDaily, Cloth Masks: Dangerous to Your Health? (Apr.
    15
    Second, contrary to petitioners’ contention that “primary responsibility for public school education” is shared by only the General Assembly and local school boards, Pet. 6–7, parents play a fundamental role in
    the education of their children. Indeed, the General Assembly has statutorily enshrined each parent’s “fundamental right to make decisions
    concerning the upbringing, education, and care of the parent’s child.”
    Code § 1-240.1. The Virginia Constitution directs the Governor to “take
    care that the laws,” including Section 1-240.1, “be faithfully executed,”
    22, 2015), https://tinyurl.com/mr3m7tuc. At least one study from members of Brown University has concluded that “masks worn in public settings and in school or daycare settings may impact a range of early developing skills, such as attachment, facial processing, and socioemotional processing.” Sean CL Deoni, et al., Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Early Child Cognitive Development: Initial Findings in a Longitudinal Observational Study of Child Health (Aug. 11, 2021),
    https://tinyurl.com/rn4zdf5n. A professor of psychology, despite concluding that the benefits of wearing masks for children outweigh the costs of
    the overall pandemic, even expressed concern that mask wearing especially negatively affects those “kids whose lingual or social development
    is atypical.” Kristen Rogers, Does Mask Wearing Harm Your Child’s Development? Experts Weigh In, CNN (Aug. 11, 2021), https://tinyurl.com/479f4y7k. And those costs are especially alarming given multiple observations regarding the “dubious findings” on which these mandates rest. See David Zweig, The CDC’s Flawed Case for Wearing Masks
    in School, The Atlantic (Dec. 16, 2021), https://tinyurl.com/5n73wd8e.
    16
    Va. Const. art. V, § 7, and EO 2 does just that, see EO 2 (“Under Virginia law, parents, not the government, have the fundamental right to
    make decisions concerning the care of their children.”).
    Last, it is exactly because, as petitioners note, “COVID-19 has
    proved to be a deadly and highly destructive virus with high transmissibility and constantly evolving variants that have made it difficult to
    control and protect against,” Pet. 7–8, that the General Assembly bestowed broad emergency powers on the Governor. Code § 44-146.17. Indeed, the previous Governor invoked this emergency authority to order
    sweeping measures ostensibly directed toward reducing transmission of
    COVID-19 by forbidding Virginians from leaving their homes for any
    other than a small number of enumerated reasons, Executive Order 55
    (2020); halting all-in person education across the entire Commonwealth,
    Executive Order 53 (2020) (Amended); ordering all Virginians to wear
    masks in public, Executive Order 63 (2020); and ordering all schools to
    impose mandatory mask mandates, Executive Order 79 (2021). Governor Youngkin has invoked these same powers to remove requirements
    that have proven ineffective in combatting transmission of COVID-19
    and instead focus on more practical methods for reducing the spread of
    17
    the disease, such as improving inspection, testing, maintenance, repair,
    replacement, and upgrades of equipment to improve the indoor air quality in school facilities. These actions are assuredly within powers the
    same emergency power previously invoked to compel the donning of
    masks and to forbid in-person education.

    CONCLUSION

    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writs of mandamus and
    prohibition should be dismissed.

    Respectfully submitted,
    Glenn A. Youngkin
    Colin Greene
    Jillian Balow

    You May Also Be Interested In

    JW Grenadier v. Leon Cooperman, Glenn Messina, OCWEN, Judge Lawyer Donald R. Alexander Verified listing

    • In the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit Leon County, Florida
    • 2024-CA-00634
    • Rico Racketeering, Constitutional Rights, Foreclosure Fraud
    • Judge Angela C. Dempsey

    Virginia Judiciary Treason "OK" with JIRC Verified listing

    • JIRC Judicial Inquiry & Review Commission For Acts & Actions of SCV Chief Justices Bernard Goodwyn, Donald Lemons, Cynthia Kinser "Fixer" Judges in Richmond, City of Alexandria, Fairfax, Orange, Culpeper & Virginia Beach Virginia
    • Divorce, Constitutional, Civil Rights, "Fake" illegal Foreclosure, unlawful arrest & assaualt by a Sheriff,
    • Chief Justice Bernard Goodwyn, Chief Justice Donald Lemmons Chief Justice Cynthia Kinser

    SCOTUS Writ of Mandamus & Prohibition for Investigation into USDC of District of Columbia for Political & Religions BIAS by Judges et al Verified listing

    • The Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS)
    • No. 23-7758
    • Writ of Mandamus & Prohibition for Investigation of Political & Religious bias of the Judges
    • John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice of the United States, ... Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice, ... Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Associate Justice, ... Sonia Sotomayor, Associate Justice, ... Elena Kagan, Associate Justice, ... Neil M. Gorsuch, Associate Justice, ... Brett M. Kavanaugh, Associate Justice, John G. Roberts, Chief Justice of the United States John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice of the United States, was born in Buffalo, New York, January 27, 1955. He married Jane Sullivan in 1996 and they have two children - Josephine and Jack. He received an A.B. from Harvard College in 1976 and a J.D. from Harvard Law School in 1979. He served as a law clerk for Judge Henry J. Friendly of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit from 1979–1980, and as a law clerk for then-Associate Justice William H. Rehnquist of the Supreme Court of the United States during the 1980 Term. He served as a Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States from 1981–1982, Associate Counsel to President Ronald Reagan, White House Counsel’s Office from 1982–1986, and as Principal Deputy Solicitor General from 1989–1993. From 1986–1989 and 1993–2003, he practiced law in Washington, D.C. He served as a Judge on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit from 2003–2005. Nominated as Chief Justice of the United States by President George W. Bush, he assumed that office on September 29, 2005. Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice, was born in the Pinpoint community near Savannah, Georgia on June 23, 1948. He attended Conception Seminary from 1967-1968 and received an A.B., cum laude, from College of the Holy Cross in 1971 and a J.D. from Yale Law School in 1974. He was admitted to law practice in Missouri in 1974, and served as an Assistant Attorney General of Missouri, 1974-1977; an attorney with the Monsanto Company, 1977-1979; and Legislative Assistant to Senator John Danforth, 1979-1981. From 1981–1982 he served as Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, U.S. Department of Education, and as Chairman of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 1982-1990. From 1990–1991, he served as a Judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. President Bush nominated him as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and he took his seat October 23, 1991. He married Virginia Lamp on May 30, 1987 and has one child, Jamal Adeen by a previous marriage. Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Associate Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Associate Justice, was born in Trenton, New Jersey, on April 1, 1950. He married Martha-Ann Bomgardner in 1985, and has two children - Philip and Laura. He served as a law clerk for Leonard I. Garth of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit from 1976–1977. He served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney, District of New Jersey, 1977–1981, as Assistant to the Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice, 1981–1985, as Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, 1985–1987, and as U.S. Attorney, District of New Jersey, 1987–1990. He was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 1990. President George W. Bush nominated him as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, and he took his seat January 31, 2006. Sonia Sotomayor, Associate Justice Sonia Sotomayor, Associate Justice, was born in Bronx, New York, on June 25, 1954. She earned a B.A. in 1976 from Princeton University, graduating summa cum laude and a member of Phi Beta Kappa and receiving the Pyne Prize, the highest academic honor Princeton awards to an undergraduate. In 1979, she earned a J.D. from Yale Law School where she served as an editor of the Yale Law Journal. She served as Assistant District Attorney in the New York County District Attorney’s Office from 1979–1984. She then litigated international commercial matters in New York City at Pavia & Harcourt, where she served as an associate and then partner from 1984–1992. In 1991, President George H.W. Bush nominated her to the U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, and she served in that role from 1992–1998. In 1997, she was nominated by President Bill Clinton to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit where she served from 1998–2009. President Barack Obama nominated her as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court on May 26, 2009, and she assumed this role August 8, 2009. Elena Kagan, Associate Justice Elena Kagan, Associate Justice, was born in New York, New York, on April 28, 1960. She received an A.B. from Princeton in 1981, an M. Phil. from Oxford in 1983, and a J.D. from Harvard Law School in 1986. She clerked for Judge Abner Mikva of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit from 1986-1987 and for Justice Thurgood Marshall of the U.S. Supreme Court during the 1987 Term. After briefly practicing law at a Washington, D.C. law firm, she became a law professor, first at the University of Chicago Law School and later at Harvard Law School. She also served for four years in the Clinton Administration, as Associate Counsel to the President and then as Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy. Between 2003 and 2009, she served as the Dean of Harvard Law School. In 2009, President Obama nominated her as the Solicitor General of the United States. A year later, the President nominated her as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court on May 10, 2010. She took her seat on August 7, 2010. Neil M. Gorsuch, Associate Justice Neil M. Gorsuch, Associate Justice, was born in Denver, Colorado, August 29, 1967. He and his wife Louise have two daughters. He received a B.A. from Columbia University, a J.D. from Harvard Law School, and a D.Phil. from Oxford University. He served as a law clerk to Judge David B. Sentelle of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and as a law clerk to Justice Byron White and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy of the Supreme Court of the United States. From 1995–2005, he was in private practice, and from 2005–2006 he was Principal Deputy Associate Attorney General at the U.S. Department of Justice. He was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 2006. He served on the Standing Committee on Rules for Practice and Procedure of the U.S. Judicial Conference, and as chairman of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Appellate Procedure. He taught at the University of Colorado Law School. President Donald J. Trump nominated him as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, and he took his seat on April 10, 2017. Brett M. Kavanaugh, Associate Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh, Associate Justice, was born in Washington, D.C., on February 12, 1965. He married Ashley Estes in 2004, and they have two daughters - Margaret and Liza. He received a B.A. from Yale College in 1987 and a J.D. from Yale Law School in 1990. He served as a law clerk for Judge Walter Stapleton of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit from 1990-1991, for Judge Alex Kozinski of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit from 1991-1992, and for Justice Anthony M. Kennedy of the U.S. Supreme Court during the 1993 Term. In 1992-1993, he was an attorney in the Office of the Solicitor General of the United States. From 1994 to 1997 and for a period in 1998, he was Associate Counsel in the Office of Independent Counsel. He was a partner at a Washington, D.C., law firm from 1997 to 1998 and again from 1999 to 2001. From 2001 to 2003, he was Associate Counsel and then Senior Associate Counsel to President George W. Bush. From 2003 to 2006, he was Assistant to the President and Staff Secretary for President Bush. He was appointed a Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 2006. President Donald J. Trump nominated him as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, and he took his seat on October 6, 2018. Amy Coney Barrett, Associate Justice Amy Coney Barrett, Associate Justice, was born in New Orleans, Louisiana, on January 28, 1972. She married Jesse M. Barrett in 1999, and they have seven children - Emma, Vivian, Tess, John Peter, Liam, Juliet, and Benjamin. She received a B.A. from Rhodes College in 1994 and a J.D. from Notre Dame Law School in 1997. She served as a law clerk for Judge Laurence H. Silberman of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit from 1997 to 1998, and for Justice Antonin Scalia of the Supreme Court of the United States during the 1998 Term. After two years in private law practice in Washington, D.C., she became a law professor, joining the faculty of Notre Dame Law School in 2002. She was appointed a Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 2017. President Donald J. Trump nominated her as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, and she took her seat on October 27, 2020. Ketanji Brown Jackson, Associate Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, Associate Justice, was born in Washington, D.C., on September 14, 1970. She married Patrick Jackson in 1996, and they have two daughters. She received an A.B., magna cum laude, from Harvard-Radcliffe College in 1992, and a J.D., cum laude, from Harvard Law School in 1996. She served as a law clerk for Judge Patti B. Saris of the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts from 1996 to 1997, Judge Bruce M. Selya of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit from 1997 to 1998, and Justice Stephen G. Breyer of the Supreme Court of the United States during the 1999 Term. After three years in private practice, she worked as an attorney at the U.S. Sentencing Commission from 2003 to 2005. From 2005 to 2007, she served as an assistant federal public defender in Washington, D.C., and from 2007 to 2010, she was in private practice. She served as a Vice Chair and Commissioner on the U.S. Sentencing Commission from 2010 to 2014. In 2012, President Barack Obama nominated her to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, where she served from 2013 to 2021. She was appointed to the Defender Services Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States in 2017, and the Supreme Court Fellows Commission in 2019. President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., appointed her to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 2021 and then nominated her as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court in 2022. She took her seat on June 30, 2022. Anthony M. Kennedy, Associate Justice Anthony M. Kennedy (Retired), Associate Justice, was born in Sacramento, California, July 23, 1936. He married Mary Davis and has three children. He received his B.A. from Stanford University and the London School of Economics, and his LL.B. from Harvard Law School. He was in private practice in San Francisco, California from 1961–1963, as well as in Sacramento, California from 1963–1975. From 1965 to 1988, he was a Professor of Constitutional Law at the McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific. He has served in numerous positions during his career, including a member of the California Army National Guard in 1961, the board of the Federal Judicial Center from 1987–1988, and two committees of the Judicial Conference of the United States: the Advisory Panel on Financial Disclosure Reports and Judicial Activities, subsequently renamed the Advisory Committee on Codes of Conduct, from 1979–1987, and the Committee on Pacific Territories from 1979–1990, which he chaired from 1982–1990. He was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 1975. President Reagan nominated him as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, and he took his seat February 18, 1988. Justice Kennedy retired from the Supreme Court on July 31, 2018. David Hackett Souter, Associate Justice David H. Souter (Retired), Associate Justice, was born in Melrose, Massachusetts, September 17, 1939. He graduated from Harvard College, from which he received his A.B. After two years as a Rhodes Scholar at Magdalen College, Oxford, he received an A.B. in Jurisprudence from Oxford University and an M.A. in 1963. After receiving an LL.B. from Harvard Law School, he was an associate at Orr and Reno in Concord, New Hampshire from 1966 to 1968, when he became an Assistant Attorney General of New Hampshire. In 1971, he became Deputy Attorney General and in 1976, Attorney General of New Hampshire. In 1978, he was named an Associate Justice of the Superior Court of New Hampshire, and was appointed to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as an Associate Justice in 1983. He became a Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit on May 25, 1990. President Bush nominated him as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, and he took his seat October 9, 1990. Justice Souter retired from the Supreme Court on June 29, 2009. Stephen G. Breyer, Associate Justice Stephen G. Breyer (Retired), Associate Justice, was born in San Francisco, California, August 15, 1938. He married Joanna Hare in 1967, and has three children - Chloe, Nell, and Michael. He received an A.B. from Stanford University, a B.A. from Magdalen College, Oxford, and an LL.B. from Harvard Law School. He served as a law clerk to Justice Arthur Goldberg of the Supreme Court of the United States during the 1964 Term, as a Special Assistant to the Assistant U.S. Attorney General for Antitrust, 1965–1967, as an Assistant Special Prosecutor of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 1973, as Special Counsel of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 1974–1975, and as Chief Counsel of the committee, 1979–1980. He was an Assistant Professor, Professor of Law, and Lecturer at Harvard Law School, 1967–1994, a Professor at the Harvard University Kennedy School of Government, 1977–1980, and a Visiting Professor at the College of Law, Sydney, Australia and at the University of Rome. From 1980–1990, he served as a Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, and as its Chief Judge, 1990–1994. He also served as a member of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 1990–1994, and of the United States Sentencing Commission, 1985–1989. President Clinton nominated him as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, and he took his seat August 3, 1994. Justice Breyer retired from the Supreme Court on June 30, 2022
    Liberty Bell

    The Liberty Bell reads:

    "Proclaim Liberty throughout the land unto all the inhabitants thereof." -Leviticus 25:10.

    Let us continue to ring the bell for Justice!

     

    Judicialpedia follows The Constitution of the United States of America which is the Supreme Law of the United States. The First Amendment: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

     

    Judicialpedia gives every American a place to exercise The First Amendment. When you post and submit a case you agree to the following: When this form is submitted, the party giving the written statement declares the facts / information stated are true and confirms this to the best of their knowledge. The party confirms that the information here is both accurate and that relevant information has not been omitted.

    Follow Us on FacebookFollow Us on TwitterFollow Us on InstagramFollow Us on Blogger
    Donate to Judicialpedia
    Add a Case or Complaint
    • Copyright and Trademark Judicialpedia 2020-2023.
    • All Rights Reserved.
    • Terms of Use
    • Contact Us

    Cart

      • Facebook
      • Twitter
      • WhatsApp
      • Telegram
      • LinkedIn
      • Tumblr
      • VKontakte
      • Mail
      • Copy link